I have been told different things about what the low oil prices mean to the drilling boom in the Utica, especially to the Ohio boom where we have more oil than gas... Does anyone have any accurate info on this subject....

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Wishing all of us the best of luck.
If there's one thing I've learned in this life it's that it's always best to try and C M O A.

I think it's also a good idea to try to hang around with folks who see it the same way.

Hopefully this way (as we proceed toward the objective) we will all try to cover our own and each others.

Peace back atcha brother.

http://seekingalpha.com/article/2782445-the-oil-price-crisis-what-i...

Summary

  • The price of WTI oil has fallen roughly -$50/barrel in the last 6+ months.
  • With US production at about 9 million barrels per day, this amounts to roughly a -1% drop in the US GDP.
  • When you add in the price drops in "finished petroleum products", the drop in US GDP may be -2.6%.

Virtually everyone has noticed the price of WTI oil fell dramatically since June 2014. Many in the US and elsewhere have been very happy to see the price of gasoline and other fuels decline considerably in the last seven months. Many have touted the positive effects the monies not spent on gasoline may have on the US economy. They believe such monies will be spent elsewhere; and that will supposedly stimulate the US economy. However, there may be significant flaws in that logic.

First the US will lose all of the revenues it derived from the higher price of oil. WTI oil prices fell from $107.68 per barrel on June 13, 2014 to a low so far of $53.60 on December 18, 2014. They closed on December 26, 2014 at $54.73 per barrel. This is more than -$50 per barrel below the June 2014 high. In November 2014, the US produced about 9 million bopd. Over a one year period the loss of about -$50 per barrel of oil revenues would amount to 9,000,000 bopd * 365 days * $50/barrel = $164.25B. For 2015 this number will be a little higher as production is expected to average 9.3 million bopd (so -$169.7B). This amounts to approximately -1% of the US GDP by itself. When you add in all of the losses due to the price falls of all the finished petroleum products, the number becomes much larger. For instance, the average price of US gasoline in December 2013 for regular unleaded was $3.268/gallon. The average price this December (2014) is $2.324/gallon. That is a 28.9% drop.

As a ballpark figure I will estimate that other finished petroleum products suffered like drops. Roughly this means that the 19.1 million bopd expected to be consumed in the US in 2015 translate into 42 gallons/barrel * 19.1 million bopd = 802.2 million gallons per day. 8.86 million of the bopd will actually be gasoline consumed; but I will just approximate losses by treating it all as gasoline. Distillate fuel oil (4.03 million bopd) and jet fuel (1.46 million bopd) are among the larger other components of US petroleum finished products consumption. The US is a net exporter of finished petroleum products by about 2 million bopd, so essentially all US finished petroleum products production is homegrown. If the US is averaging -$0.944/gallon less in revenues, this amounts to 802.2 million gallons per day * $0.944 = $757.28 million per day. Over a full year this amounts to $276.41B in lost revenues to US industries; and that does not even take into account the economic multiplier effect of such revenues being spent again within the US economy. Hence the total almost direct loss to the US economy of the -$50/barrel in oil price (and the finished petroleum products price losses) is about -$441B.

According to TradingEconomics the US GDP for 2014 is estimated at $16.8T. $441B is about -2.6% of the US GDP. That is a lot of revenue to lose. Some point out that the revenue not spent on oil, gasoline, and other finished petroleum products will then be available to be spent on other US goods and services. The problem with that rational is that a lot of those monies would have been available to be spent again (the multiplier effect) on other US goods and services after they were originally spent on oil and finished petroleum products. For instance, oil company salaries are usually re-spent on other goods and services.

As a result of the dramatic oil price drop, oil companies are cutting back on their CapEx plans for 2015. For oil and gas E&P companies, CapEx expenses are mostly drilling and completion expenses. Cuts to CapEx mean that there will be a lot less drilling and completion work done in FY2015. As an example, Continental Resources (NYSE:CLR), a large US unconventional oil and gas developer, cut its $5.2B CapEx budget for FY2015 to $4.6B last month; and it recently cut it further to $2.7B this month (December 2014). This is about a 48% cut to the FY2015 CapEx budget. Since a small amount of the CapEx isn't for drilling and completion activity, one might say CLR is now planning to do 50% less drilling and completion work in FY2015. This will cut CLR's growth immensely. It will also negatively impact any oil services companies CLR employs. Those companies will receive billions less in revenues in FY2015; and they in turn will cut their purchases from still other companies such as US Steel (NYSE:X), which supplies the steel tubing used in drilling. All of these companies will lay off employees, since less work will be being done. Those laid off will in turn spend less money on other US goods and services such as food, clothes, rent, etc. It is easy to see this negative pattern.

Of course, many will argue that the monies not spent on oil will be spent on things other than oil products. There are a few problems with this. First most people need gasoline to get to work, to go shopping, to transport the kids, etc. It is a necessity. More food, more clothes, etc. that the monies could alternatively be used for may not be nearly as essential. This probably means that people will pay off credit cards more. Perhaps they will save more. While these are good things, they do not tend to make economies grow as quickly. They tend to decrease the velocity of money; and hence they tend to decrease the money supply, especially if banks are hesitant to over lend when the world economy seems to be generally weakening. In sum less of the monies overall would be spent immediately. Plus the multiplier effect would likely be a lower multiple. That may mean that the US economy may lose -1% to -2.6% in GDP just from oil price cuts alone.

Admittedly some companies should benefit. Airlines such as United Continental Holdings (NYSE:UAL), American Airlines Group (NASDAQ:AAL), and Southwest Airlines (NYSE:LUV) should see cost benefits to lower fuel prices. The same is probably true for delivery companies such as FedEx (NYSE:FDX) and United Parcel Service (NYSE:UPS). Manufacturers that use delivery services a lot should see lower delivery costs. One might think this last would make their products more competitive. However, even this may not be true. The delivery fuel costs for foreign products are much higher. Therefore cuts to fuel costs should help them reduce their prices disproportionately more compared to US manufacturing companies selling in the US. This might have the effect of making US companies less competitive in the US and even worldwide. That in turn would lead to a decrease in US GDP growth.

Another supposed positive that may be less so is the decrease in the oil trade deficit due to the large decrease in oil prices worldwide. This will likely help the USD gain against other currencies because it should decrease the outflow of monies from the US economy. In other words it should cut down the rate of growth of debt to foreign countries due to oil. That should lead to a stronger USD. Unfortunately a stronger USD will negatively impact US exports. That in turn will tend to slow the US economy. Further the stronger USD will tend to make foreign products cheaper for US consumers. This will make foreign products sell better against US products. It may mean an overall increase in foreign imports in other areas that may be hard to reverse once oil prices rise again. It may lead to the loss of more US jobs to foreign businesses. This again should result in lower US GDP growth.

The BOJ currently has a huge QE program in place. The ECB has announced that it wants to have a €1 trillion QE program in 2015. Thus far Germany has not agreed to it; but a recent Bloomberg survey reported that 90% of the economists surveyed believed that Germany would eventually agree to Draghi's plan. Since Germany's economy has been troubled lately itself, the economists are likely right. These QE programs will in turn likely lead to an even stronger USD. That will lead to lower US exports; and it will likely lead to even lower oil prices for the US. We may not have seen the bottom in oil yet, although we are likely close to a bottom. The bottom may come after the ECB's QE program is finally approved and started. The consequently lower oil prices may put even further pressure on the US economy.

It may be impossible to estimate exactly how much of a negative effect lower oil prices will have on the US economy. However, this article should make it reasonably clear that lower US oil prices are unlikely to be a positive for the US economy. If prices had only fallen to $80-$90/barrel level, then the CapEx estimates for oil companies and oil services companies would have been much less affected. The economic damage would have been much less. However, as few people seem to realize, dramatic changes tend to cause dramatic damage to industries. Such damages are not as easily repaired as the damages from smaller downward moves. The US and US citizens should prepare for some uglier than expected times ahead. Just how bad those times will be will depend on many other factors. A lot of these are unpredictable at the present time. Central banks and national governments may exert some control. Still investors should be aware of the possibilities and likelihoods.

The chart of the SPDR S&P 500 ETF (NYSEARCA:SPY) provides some technical information about the state of the general market.

(click to enlarge)

As investors can see this chart is still in a relatively strong uptrend in spite of the recent oil price decline. However, the SPY has been showing a lot more weakness lately. It may possibly turn downward in the weeks and months to come. One critical event may be the January 22, 2015 ECB meeting. We are likely to hear whether Germany has acceded to the Draghi QE plan at that time. If Germany does accede to the plan, US equities could get some extra monies from EU investors. European investors would benefit from both a US equities rise and a USD rise. Each would be much more likely to occur if the EU was awash in an extra €1 trillion in liquidity.

Sometimes investors just have to wait on events to see what will happen. This is likely one of those times. A downturn (bear market) could be put off for another year or more, if the ECB QE plan is implemented. However, those expecting a lot of help for the US economy from low oil prices seem likely to be sorely disappointed. Certain industries may be helped; but overall the damage to the price structure and oil industries will be too dramatic not to be harmful to the US economy. The numbers support this argument well. The old adage that crashes lead to more crashes, also supports this thesis. Investors need to watch events closely. This is a critical time. It could be a time of injury to the markets; or it could be a time of dramatic injury to the markets. Only time and events will tell. The situation bears close scrutiny.

A more optimistic prediction:

Global trends: Shale and the China factor in declining oil prices

Published on Dec 27, 2014 7:15 AM
 
 Two big factors driving the price of oil are the exploitation of shale oil and gas in the United States, and the shift in China’s economic focus from one of quantity to quality, which implied that its demand for oil would moderate. -- PHOTO: REUTERS




In late 1979, I began work on my PhD thesis, an empirical investigation of the Opec surplus and its disposal. It was the end of a decade in which oil prices had undergone two dramatic increases, and most of the various geniuses of the day were confidently predicting that they would continue to soar, from under US$40 per barrel - a historic high at that time - to above US$100. By the time I finished my research in 1982, the price of oil had begun what would become a 20-year plunge. It would not hit US$100 per barrel until January 2008.

I used to joke that the most important thing I learnt from my research was never to attempt to forecast the price of oil. As 2014 comes to a close, the price of oil has just crossed the US$100 threshold again - this time headed down. One of the big questions for 2015 is whether the decline will continue. Despite my earlier cynicism, I think I know the answer.

Over the past 33 years, I have had plenty of opportunity to study both oil prices and foreign exchange rates, including overseeing a research department of talented people trying to predict their movements. The experience has left me with a good deal of scepticism - not to mention bruises. But I do believe that it is possible to make a broad prediction as to where oil prices are headed.

Over the course of my career, I have tried to determine whether there is such a thing as an equilibrium oil price. I have spent many hours trying to guide, cajole and beg my energy analysts to create a model that might identify it, just as we have for currencies, bond yields and equities. I have also discussed the idea with industry experts, most of whom believe that one exists, but that it moves around a lot, because it is greatly influenced by the marginal cost of oil production - itself an unstable variable.

My conclusion is that a good indication of this moving equilibrium does exist: the five-year forward oil price, or the amount paid for guaranteed delivery of oil five years from now.

In my ongoing quest to become better at forecasting, I began, a few years ago, to pay attention to the five-year forward oil price as it compares to the Brent crude oil spot price, the price of a barrel of oil today. I suspect that the five-year forward price is much less influenced by speculation in the oil market than the spot price, and more representative of true commercial needs. So when the five-year price starts moving in a different direction than the spot price, I take notice.

In 2011, after both prices had recovered from the collapse induced by the 2008 credit crisis, the five-year price started to come down gradually, while the spot price continued to surge for a while. This jibed with what I had identified as two big factors fundamentally driving the price of oil: the early days of the exploitation of shale oil and gas in the United States, and the shift in China's economic focus from quantity to quality, which implied that the Chinese economy would no longer be consuming energy at the frenetic rate it had been.

I concluded that there was a fair chance that oil prices were peaking and that before too long spot prices would reverse and start to decline. I thought it was probably the beginning of a move back down to US$80 per barrel - precisely where the price has landed at the end of 2014. The spot price has even recently slipped below that level. It was one of my better forecasts.

I no longer make predictions for a living, but I do know one thing: Oil prices will either rise or fall. And I suspect that I know which way they will go. I recently read an article that suggested that, if oil prices remain at recent levels, US production of shale oil and gas next year could be 10 per cent below recent projections. That seems plausible; and, given how important shale oil and gas have become to America's economic recovery, it also seems like something that US policymakers would be eager to avoid.

They may very well get their wish. Oil prices may not start rising in the coming months, but, as 2014 comes to a close, forces that will eventually halt their decline are beginning to appear.

The drop in the spot price of oil has taken it significantly below the five-year forward price, which remains close to US$80 per barrel.

My hunch for 2015 is that oil prices may continue to drop in the short term; unlike in the past four years, however, they are likely to finish the year higher than they were when it began.

PROJECT SYNDICATE

Jim O'Neill, a former chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, is a visiting research fellow at Bruegel, the Brussels-based economic think-tank.

- See more at: http://www.straitstimes.com/news/opinion/more-opinion-stories/story...

Natural Gas: Commitment Of Traders Analysis

Summary

  • Despite physical indicators showing net NG deficiency in winter, HH prices turned sharply downward.
  • The Commitment of Traders (COT) data shows significant differences between WTI crude and Natural Gas.
  • The COT data for NG, extrapolated, indicates a Flip sometime in January, as Long overwhelms Short - both Commercial and Non-Commercial, simultaneously.
  • With the Flip, there is no need for a Perfect Storm.

1. Background

In a recent article (NG: Predicting, Especially the Future), we have yet again carelessly predicted a sharp rise in the prices of NG this 2015 winter, based on a physical model driven by projected consumption and diminishing reserves.

We seem to be in the midst of an undeclared war by Saudi Arabia on Iran and Russia, so crude oil prices are in near free fall: from over $100 per barrel, to about $55/BBL, just about 50% lower. We should mention that LNG prices in Asia are derived from crude prices; a rough measure is LNG/MBTU is 13% - 17% of Crude/BBL, for the so-called Japan Crude Cocktail, JCC. So, by inference, NG must also be getting cheaper, or should it. That is, if we were exporting any LNG, which we are not.

The weather seemed warmer than average for this side of December in the US northeast. Then came the NG price tumble on Friday, December 19, followed by Monday, December 22. Essentially the price on the February and March futures contracts of Henry Hub NG (NGG15 and NGH15, respectively) came down from about $3.60 to $3.00, some $6,000 loss per contract. The question in everybody's mind is, what the heck is happening? The simple answer is, nothing out of the ordinary.

Figures 1 and 2 provide a snapshot of Friday the 19th for February 2015 NG and WTI/NYMEX crude. Note that the volume is 62 thousand.

(click to enlarge)

Expecting WTI to drop? Here is a small surprise, in Fig. 2. As NG futures tumble, WTI crude picks up $2.77 per barrel, i.e., $2,770 per contract. We note here that traffic is 5 times larger than NG, with volume at 367 thousand.

(click to enlarge)

A few days later, WTI came back down, and went down further, resting currently at $55/BBL.

In summary, winter seems mild, there are publications of NG storage levels being "highest in 3 years", but no weekly storage data in support. Further publications allude to large surplus in NG production, again no concrete numbers. Actually, the recent peak in EIA reported storage is the lowest peak in 3 years. Shale today provides 40% of all NG in the US. With the recent Q3/2014 moves by shale operators out and away from dry gas and into oil shale, as reported, we should expect less, not more NG production from shale. Finally, there is no mention of consumption, or balance. After all, in all winters, consumption exceeds production. We therefore end up with some psychological notions as driver, which are not in agreement with physical reality.

To gain some insight into this interesting market dynamics, we turn to the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, or US CFTC. Specifically we refer to the Commitment of Traders (COT) report, published each normal Friday afternoon, pertaining to trading in the preceding Tuesday of the week. The last such report available at the time of this writing is for Tuesday, Dec. 16, 2014. Gratefully, dis-Aggregated Historical data file is available for the current full year, for download in Excel format.

To get a sense of perspective, we start with WTI oil futures. This field is energy related, and certain cross correlations to NG are inevitable.

2. WTI NYMEX Futures and Price Moves

As mentioned above, on or about July 8, 2014 there started a slide in the price of WTI. Figure 3 shows (EIA Data, 2014) price moves for the front month contract for 2014.

Two striking events are marked in Fig. 3. The first is the onset of the price slide, July 8. This was about the time the US has declared an open direct diplomatic track for negotiation with Iran over its nuclear armaments program, and the date that negotiation was approved by the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, seen half smiling in the enclosed event photo; Mr. Hassan Rouhani, President, is not amused. Also, not coincidentally, the time when the Hamas war on Israel became a full-blown reality, officially acknowledged.

(click to enlarge)

The US effort to resolve Iran's nuclear armament drive by diplomacy remains extremely worrisome to the Saudis, until now an ally, moreover, a quasi-state in the Union. The house of Saud relied on the US to provide ultimate security, in return for providing unlimited oil at reasonable price. The Saudis know the Iranian rulers will never give up their nuclear ambitions, unless forced. They also know the Iranians will (yet again) lie to appear negotiating, while actually running the centrifuges to the maximum, to get fissionable mass for a few nuclear bombs. The Saudis know the sanctions are working, and that Iran's economy is on the brink of collapse. However, the US President's current approach toward Syria, and to Iran, remains on a track of peaceful diplomacy. Indeed, to show good will, on July 21, the US granted release of $2.8 billion in frozen Iranian assets, and provided 4 more months of centrifugal freedom, to November 24; by which time, an Agreement must be reached. Thus, the trump card against Iran is unused, and the nuclear clock is ticking. Note that July 21 also marks a mini-tumble in WTI oil prices, Fig. 3; in view of the above, not coincidentally. It is also the first time Hamas agreed to discuss a cease-fire, again not coincidentally.

Of course, Iran does not need a nuclear weapon to obliterate Saudi oilfields and Gulf terminals with its conventional SS missiles. Iran has full capability for that, but it needs to actually fire, or to send suicide bombers, or else effective defenses would be deployed to defeat such attack. However, armed with nuclear weapons, Iran does not need to act anymore. A spoken threat would be sufficient. This is something the Saudis, along with other gulf states, cannot tolerate.

So what is Saudi Arabia to do? The only advantage available to it, is petroleum. Its use as a weapon is simple. Drive to lower crude oil prices drastically, and the weaker economies depending on its export will be crippled or collapse. This is far cleaner than a messy shooting war. Just need to open the spigot on the largest world reservoir to the maximum, and the hell with weaker demand. Oh, and to appear environmentally well-meaning, ostensibly declare your target as defeating the US shale-oil producers, a negligible speck of the market.

They taught us in the Army that the attacker should outnumber the entrenched defender 3:1, and should expect significant losses in attaining its objective. Indeed war is painful. Saudi Arabia (CIA 2014 data) has a population of 23.37 million, and (World Bank data, 2014) GDP of $745.27 Billion. It is exporting (CIA) 6.88 million barrels per day (BPD) of crude oil. If the price of oil dropped by $45/BBL for 12 months, the Saudis would sustain the equivalent of an annual GDP loss of 15.2%. Iran, A nation of 80.8 million people, (CIA) and GDP of $368.9 billion (World Bank data, 2014), should be exporting 2.44 million BPD . The same 12 month period and $45/BBL loss, would mean an equivalent 10.9% GDP loss for Iran. One must remember, however, that Iran's economy is already in bad shape, while Saudi Arabia remains highly bankable, and can possibly sustain several years of such belt tightening. Also, the damage on per-capita basis is amplified at least 3.5 times higher to Iran than to Saudi Arabia.

We finally note that on November 24 it became clear that the Vienna P5+1 nuclear talks with Iran failed, while 4 months were centrifuged away. Instead of tightening sanctions abruptly, the US announced an open door policy on diplomatic solution, an agreement to differ, perhaps gradual easement of sanctions; and maybe, cooperation with Iran on ISIL?. On November 25, Goldman Sachs has downgraded its outlook on crude oil from $90/BBL to $70/BBL, which coincided with (if not directly caused) a significant mini-slide in WTI price, see Fig.3.

Now what has the commitment of traders to do with this scene? As we all know, Futures traders are divided into three categories. Commercial traders are those dealing directly with the physical underlying, like oil producers, refiners, oilfield services providers. The Non-Commercial traders, are hedge funds, investment banks, institutions. The first two types are required to file reports with the CFTC, and tend to be big, multi-million interests. The third kind is very small in comparison, private investors, which are termed non-reporting. Each group will include Long (buyers) as well as Short (sellers). The Non-Commercial group has an additional class of "Spread" trades, which contain coupled, equal-number of Long and Short Future trades. At any given moment in the Futures market, the total number of open Long and open Short positions must match perfectly, for obvious reasons. The CFTC COT report provides the number of trades in each category at the weekly Tuesday reporting day's end. This is the basis for all related data used here.

A snapshot of the last COT report available at this writing is provided in Figs 4.a and 4.b, which show the trader composition of WTI at NYMEX, on December 16, 2014, for Long, and for Short trades, respectively.

What is evident from Fig. 4a is, that non-commercial (NC) trades dominate at 64% of the field in Long positions, where commercial (COM) trades are just 31%. Regarding Short positions, Fig. 4b shows 51% held by commercial trades, and the NC and others make up the other half, combined. We also note the total number of open interests was 1.48 million. Evidently, the commercial trades are overwhelmingly on the Short side. It would be interesting to see the recent-historical behavior of Trades on this WTI Future market. Figure 5 provides a timewise distribution.

(click to enlarge)

In Fig. 5 we see the variation of WTI trades for the 12 months 2014. Until July 8, COM Shorts (orange line on top) were between 900,000 and 1 million, while NC Short + Spread (the red and green lines) were rather flat. After July 8, The number of commercial Shorts declines quite strongly, until Nov. 25. In the meantime, NC Shorts are moderately rising. In other words, while COM entities reduce selling in an attempt to support a higher price, the NC Short trades are betting on the WTI prices to fall. We also note a declining COM and NC buy (Longs, dark blue line and light blue) activity after July 8, ending about Nov. 25; these COM and NC Long distributions are in near-perfect sync after July 8.

On November 25 we see a sharp rise in WTI COM Short sales, perhaps in recognition that the WTI price will keep falling further, so, lock in the current price. NC Long and NC Spread (light blue and light green lines) buying are rising after Nov. 25, perhaps assuming the market is about to bottom, which it has not.

What is the value of COM Shorts relative to the total US crude oil market? If we consider US consumption at 19 million BPD, and the daily number of open COM Short positions on Dec. 16, 2014 is 752,236, at 1,000 BBL/contract. Thus by volume we are looking at 3.6% of the total physical market. Not much.

In summary of this somewhat long introduction above, we conclude that the WTI NYMEX Future market may react to, but not in any imaginable way drive, the price or availability of crude oil in the US. This should hold regardless of whether one accepts, or rejects, the foregoing theory of the implicit Saudi war on Iran. We must emphasize that both July 8, as well as November 25, have serious geopolitical implications for the world's premier oil supplier, and that both dates find distinct expression in the WTI price, and the Futures market, as shown.

That said, we are reminded of the quote by Douglas Hubbard in his book "How to Measure Anything". The 2 biggest mistakes in interpreting a correlation: The biggest mistake, assuming that the correlation proves causality; second biggest mistake, that the correlation is not evidence of causation.

3. What about Natural Gas Futures?

And now, something completely different. In a recent article by this author, quoted above, it was noted that certain physical features in the balance between production, storage, and consumption, can be construed to produce a sharp rise in NG prices in the winter, driven by local demand. How is this vision supported, or refuted, by the commitment of traders ? We take a hard look with the available 2014 data from CFTC.

Figure 6 show total open interest in Futures on Henry Hub Inter-Continental Exchange (ICE), compared with COM Short positions, and also overlaid with the Henry Hub prices for the same period.

(click to enlarge)

Firstly, it is evident that we are looking at a very large volume relative to the total annual NG market. The total number of open interests went over the last 12 months from about 6 million, to about 4.5 million. Each contract involves 10,000 Mega-BTU (MBTU). The corresponding total volume on Dec. 16 was 4.467 million contracts, equivalent to 43.67 TSCF. The annual US consumption of NG (EIA, 2014) is about 26 TSCF. So the proportion of open positions to total market by volume is 168%. Very high, and very different from crude oil futures visited above.

What is the composition of NG trades for these futures? Figures 7a and 7b provide a Dec. 16 snapshot, based on the same COT report.

(click to enlarge)

(click to enlarge)

It is shown that the dominant force are the COM Long positions, 69% of all Longs, and the COM Short positions, 71.6% of all Shorts. Non-Commercial interests are dwarfed in comparison. Is there a question as to which of the two, COM or NC, drives the market? Similar to the calculation above, we see that COM Shorts comprise 3.206 million contracts, equivalent to a volume of 31.34 TSCF, or 120% of the total annual domestic market.

In brief summary, it seems that pessimistic commercial interest expect a significant decline in NG price, with Short overwhelming Long positions-until very recently.

Now we turn to the full COT report for the NG HH in 2014, for historical perspective, showing all 5 distinct trade positions. This is shown in Fig. 8.

(click to enlarge)

Figure 8 shows that significantly on October 28, there was a temporary "flip" point, shared by both commercial (COM) and Non-commercial trades. Long and Short volumes intersect, respectively, and then re-separate. By "intersect" we mean specifically that Long overcomes Short. The effect on the Henry Hub ICE prices is shown in Fig. 6 above: a temporary, sharp rise from $3.54 to $4.22/MBTU. This upward trend peaked on November 18, followed by a rapid decline in the price.

Looking again at the late fall of 2014 in Fig. 8, we see that Long and Short resume lower and higher positions after the brief Oct. 28 "flip". To affect an upward change in price direction, a dominant trading class must go through a flip, where the previously low buys dominate the previously high sells. By far, the COM trades dominate this futures market. We drew 2 polynomial trend lines through the COM Short (2nd order) and the COM Long (3rd order). A persistent intersection is indicated sometime in January.

Of course, the information in the COT report is already late when we see it. However, what is important to observe is the trend, through near-term history. Thus, sometimes in January, as both (forward projected) COM and NC cross-overs indicate, the price of NG will rise. A very large winter storm thrown in, with record low temperatures could help, but is not really necessary. This is very different from WTI crude in Fig. 5.

As a precaution, we should remember the wise words of the disillusioned Macbeth (William Shakespeare, Act 5, Sc. 5):

"Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow/ Creeps in its petty pace from day to day / To the last syllable of recorded time. / And all our yesterdays have lighted fools / The way to dusty death. Out, out brief candle--"

Likely referring to the Futures candle charts. Here is wishing all a very prosperous and happy new year!

Summary

  • Oil is extremely oversold and due for a rebound.
  • Oil consumption remains strong and is likely to increase thanks to cheaper prices.
  • Historically oil rebounds quite quickly, especially when the U.S. and global economy are growing.
  • Investors are overly negative on oil ever since the OPEC meeting, but production cuts could still be on the way.

Ever since the November 27th OPEC meeting the price of oil has plunged by about 20% and many stocks are off by much, much more. The doomsayers and shorts are out in force now, emboldened by the weakness in this sector. There is a tremendous amount of negative sentiment towards oil now. But this extreme level of negativity appears to be very overdone. It also seems to be based on psychology, forced margin call selling, panic selling and tax-loss selling. With all these factors, it's been a perfect storm that has brought some small-cap oil stocks back to levels not seen since the depths of the financial crisis. Back in 2009, oil plunged to the $40 range, but the U.S. and the global economy were in free fall and oil consumption was also falling. The factors that drove oil to collapse in 2009 like bank failures, financial system imploding, home prices collapsing, massive layoffs, and other negatives that just do not exist today. That is why it does not make sense to be expecting oil to plunge back towards the lows seen in 2009. Furthermore, it is really important to realize that even when oil plunged in 2009, it rebounded very, very quickly (in spite of all the doomsayers back then). That is another big factor to consider because since the global economy is significantly stronger now, it could rebound sooner than most investors realize. Here are a few more reasons why this is a buying opportunity as oil is not likely to go down much more and why it is not likely to stay down for very long:

Reason #1: Energy company insiders are calling the recent plunge in stocks a "fire sale" and they are buying at a pace that has not been seen in years. Oil industry insiders have seen the ups and downs in oil prices and have experienced market pullbacks before. If oil company insiders are buying en masse now, there is a good chance that they see bargains and a strong future for oil. This supports the idea that there is a disconnect between the current market price of many oil stocks and the longer-term fundamentals of this industry. Citigroup (NYSE:C) recently made a strong case that indicates there is a disconnect between asset prices in the oil industry and the fundamentals. A Bloomberg article details some of the recent insider activity, it states:

"This is an absolute fire sale," he said. "It's an overreaction and the result is it's oversold." With valuations at a decade low, oil executives such as Rochford and Chesapeake Energy Corp.'s (NYSE:CHK) Archie Dunham are driving the biggest wave of insider buying since 2012, data compiled by the Washington Service and Bloomberg show. They're snapping up stocks after more than $300 billion was erased from share values as crude slipped below $70 for the first time since 2010."

Reason #2: Just because OPEC did not act at the November 27th meeting, it does not mean they won't act. OPEC is scheduled to meet again in 2015, but there is always the possibility for an emergency meeting at any time. Even a statement from OPEC discussing the willingness to cut production or to address "cheating" by some members who are producing more than their quota allows could cause a significant short-covering rebound in the oil sector. A CNBC article points out that some industry watchers believe OPEC could act soon with an extraordinary or "emergency" meeting, it states:

"We see the possibility they call an extraordinary meeting sometime next year," said Dominic Haywood, crude and products analyst with Energy Aspects. "We think they're going to address countries not living within their quota." OPEC has a quota of 30 million barrels a day, but it has been producing more.

A Wall Street Journal Article that was published before the OPEC meeting is telling because it indicates that OPEC might not have realized that oil would drop as much as it has, since their decision was released on November 27th. It quotes one OPEC official as stating that production cuts would occur if oil was to fall to $70 and it states:

"At $70 a barrel, there will be panic in OPEC. We have become used to living with $100 a barrel," said one OPEC official, speaking on the sidelines of the meeting. Were prices to fall to "$70 a barrel, there will be action from OPEC," according to another OPEC official."

On December 2, a Saudi Prince stated that his country would cut production if other countries would also participate. This seems the first "olive branch" since the OPEC meeting and it appears to be in response to the slide in oil since that meeting took place.

Reason #3: The perceived "glut" of oil is much smaller than most people realize. Furthermore, that excess supply could be taken out rather rapidly because cheaper oil is likely to lead to more demand and consumption. Toyota (NYSE:TM) just reported that sales of its 4Runner sport utility vehicle just jumped by 53% in November and sales of the Prius fell by 14% in the same period. This is just one example of how quickly demand for oil can rise and if you multiply even slight increases in global oil consumption because of much lower prices the numbers get quite large. Urban Carmel (a former McKinsey consultant and President of UBS Securities in Asia) believes that oil is going back to $80 per barrel and a recent article he wrote explains why the perceived glut is not going to last long, he states:

"Excess oil supply (over demand) is presently about 1 mbd. That would be a problem for oil prices except for one thing: existing fields lose about 6% of their production capacity each year, equal to about 5.5 mbd. That means that even if demand is flat, at least 4.5 mbd in new production is needed. Opec has spare capacity of only about 3 mbd. The remainder must come from new investment. New deep water and oil sand projects have a breakeven cost of about $80-90. There will be little incentive to make these investments unless the price of oil is at least $80. If the price stays lower than $80, supply will be insufficient for demand. It's exactly under those circumstances that spikes higher in oil prices have occurred in the past."

Reason #4: Oil can be very volatile, but it historically rebounds very quickly because it is used in very large quantities every day. The chart below shows that oil has reached a level that is giving investors a buy signal. Also, it is worth noting that prior oil price slides typically lasted about 20 weeks and the current slide is on week 25 which is another sign a rebound is way overdue. Oil and most oil stocks are extremely oversold now and that means a powerful relief and short covering rally could be coming soon. Some "smart money" investors are recognizing the buying opportunity at hand. Hedge funds are starting to position for a rebound in oil as there is a growing belief that the oil slide has run its course and is now due for a rally.

Oil is already down by about 40%, and the global economy is not in a current state that would support drastically lower prices as some are predicting. It is worth noting that most analysts and economists have a terrible track record when it comes to forecasting oil prices. If you had told anyone that oil was going to surge to over $100 within a couple years of the financial crisis you would have been ridiculed. I believe that the inaction at the OPEC meeting triggered margin call selling, and as we know, selling begets selling especially at this time of year when tax-loss selling fuels even more downside pressure. Some investors are making too much of the oil price decline by trying to connect the dots which should not be connected. I don't believe that oil's decline is a major sign of global economic weakness, I believe it is partially because supplies are temporarily a bit higher than needed, the dollar has been strong, and because too many speculators held futures contracts that were suddenly liquidated after the OPEC meeting sparked a sell-off. This has created bargains, especially in small-cap oil stocks. I have been primarily focusing my buying on companies that have no direct exposure to the price of oil and significant contract backlogs. This has led me to buy stocks like McDermott International (NYSE:MDR) which is now incredibly cheap at less than $3 per share. This company is an engineering and construction firm that specializes in the energy industry. It has a $4 billion contract backlog and it has about $900 million in cash and (incredibly) a market cap of just $584 million. That means that this company could buy all the outstanding shares and still have over $300 million left in cash on the balance sheet. McDermott shares are also trading for less than half of the stated book value which is $6.30 per share. On November 14, David Trice (a director) bought 20,000 shares at $4.16, which was about $83,000 worth of stock. But, due to immensely negative sentiment in the oil sector, panic selling, margin call selling, and tax-loss selling, this stock is down by about 40% just from when this insider bought, even though this company has no direct exposure to oil prices and enough business (with the $4 billion+ contract backlog) to keep it busy for the next two years. It also does projects for the natural gas industry and investors seem to have overlooked that natural gas prices have remained solid.

I also see opportunity in Willbros Group (NYSE:WG) which trades for just over $4 now (down from a high of about $13 this year). It specializes in pipeline projects for the energy industry which includes oil and gas, petrochemicals, refining as well as electric power. This stock took a hit several weeks ago when the company announced it would restate earnings due to a charge on a pipeline project that was estimated to reverse about $8 million in previously reported pre-tax income. This caused the company to be delayed in filing the latest financial report and the market overreacted by knocking off about $160 million in market cap in just a few days after the restatement issue was announced. Willbros Group has a strong balance sheet and a $1.7 billion backlog which absolutely dwarfs the restatement numbers and the market cap of just about $215 million. It also recently announced plans for an asset sale that is estimated to generate up to $125 million. For more details, read my recent article on Willbros Group.

I expect that small cap stocks like McDermott and Willbros will rebound as tax-loss selling should fade by December 19th which is the Friday before the holiday season. This causes most traders and investors to have completed their tax planning issues before taking off for the holidays and that often leads to a significant "Santa Claus" and "January Effect" rally in beaten-down small caps.

Data is sourced from Yahoo Finance. No guarantees or representations are made. Hawkinvest is not a registered investment advisor and does not provide specific investment advice. The information is for informational purposes only. You should always consult a financial advisor.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/07/shale-drilling-prices-kem...

COLUMN-U.S. oil production will be falling by end of 2015: Kemp

Wed Jan 7, 2015 7:46am EST

(John Kemp is a Reuters market analyst. The views expressed are his own)

By John Kemp

Jan 7 (Reuters) - Unless prices recover, U.S. oil production will start falling before the end of 2015 as new drilling is insufficient to replace declining output from wells completed in 2013 and 2014.

Future production depends on the rate of decline from existing wells (known as the decline curve) and the average age of old oil wells as well as the number of new ones drilled and their productivity.

Decline curves for typical shale wells in the Bakken, the Permian Basin and the Eagle Ford are all widely available on the internet, as are basic data on the number of wells in each play and their approximate age.

In the short term, U.S. oil production is set to continue rising because there is still a backlog of wells waiting for fracturing crews and completion after the record drilling during the first ten months of 2014.

In North Dakota, for example, there were around 650 wells waiting on completion services at the end of October 2014 because drillers had outpaced completion crews, according to the state's Department of Mineral Resources.

As these wells are completed, there will be a significant increase in reported output because newly completed wells yield extremely high rates of production in the first few days and months after starting to flow.

But as the backlog is cleared, production will plateau and then start to fall, as new drilling and completions fails to keep up with the declining output from older wells.

RECENTLY DRILLED WELLS

Daily production from a typical Bakken well falls by around 65 percent by the end of the first year, then another 35 percent by the end of the second, 15 percent by the end of the third, and around 10 percent per year thereafter, according to state regulators (link.reuters.com/kup73w).

There are currently around 8,600 wells producing from the Bakken shale, of which more than 2,000 were drilled and completed in 2014, with another 1700 dating from 2013 and 1700 dating from 2012.

Almost a quarter of Bakken wells are under a year old and their output is set to decline by as much as two-thirds in the year ahead.

In total, more than half the wells in the Bakken are less than three years old, and these rapidly declining wells account for the vast majority of oil output (link.reuters.com/nup73w).

To replace the declining production from this large inventory of recent wells, companies would need to drill more than 2,000 new wells in 2015.

But drilling rates have already started to fall sharply and the number of new wells will fall far short of the replacement rate unless oil prices improve.

The number of rigs active in the state has fallen to just 169, down from 191 in October, according to the Department of Mineral Resources.

Further declines in drilling are virtually certain in the months ahead as rig crews come to the end of their existing contracts.

CASH CONSERVATION

Sweet crude from the Bakken fetched less than $32 per barrel on Jan 6, and sour crudes were worth less than $23, according to posted prices from Plains Marketing.

At these price levels, there are no parts of the Bakken, whether in the core areas of the play or on the periphery, where drilling new wells makes financial sense.

Most of the small and medium-sized independent oil producing firms which dominate shale plays rely on borrowing to fund new wells and already carry a high debt burden.

The imperative in the current environment will be to conserve as much cash as possible by limiting the cost of new drilling and abandoning plans to drill wells which are not profitable (which is most of them at current prices).

The same pattern is repeated with only minor differences in the Permian Basin and Eagle Ford in Texas, the two other major shale plays.

In both, there are large stocks of relatively young and rapidly declining oil wells drilled in 2013 and 2014. Meanwhile rigs are being idled as small debt-laden exploration and production companies try to conserve cash.

Across the United States, oil production has surged by more than 3 million barrels per day in the last four years and by more than 2 million in the last two years alone.

But almost all of that production increase has come from recently fractured shale wells which are now declining rapidly and must be replaced to sustain let alone grow output.

However, drilling rates are plummeting. The industry has idled almost 130 oil-directed rigs (8 percent of the total) since Oct 10, according to oilfield services company Baker Hughes.

Oil-directed rigs are being idled at the fastest rate since the financial crisis in 2009 and before than 1991 and 1988, and hundreds more will be taken out of service in the next few months.

The net result is that production will be declining month on month by the end of the year, though in the next few months it might continue increasing.

PRODUCTIVITY AND COSTS

Some analysts have questioned whether U.S. oil output will indeed fall, arguing improvements in drilling and well productivity will offset the smaller number of rigs operating and wells drilled.

That seems implausible. Given the large stock of comparatively new wells, rapid decline rates, and sharp drop in rigs operating, a truly enormous improvement in productivity would be needed to keep production flat let alone on a rising trend.

Costs will come down as the price of everything from rig hire to fracking sand and contractor rates are renegotiated. But it would need an epic reduction in costs to make shale oil profitable at less than $45 per barrel in Texas and Oklahoma and $35 per barrel in North Dakota.

Analysts with an optimistic view about production (and a bearish view on prices) can point to two important examples where output was flat or continued to increase despite steep price falls.

In 2009, oil output in North Dakota and the United States flattened though it did not fall much in response to plummeting prices amid the financial crisis and recession and a slowdown in new drilling.

And U.S. natural gas production has continued to rise each year since 2008 despite the depressed level of gas prices and the number of gas-directed rigs falling by more than three-quarters.

Neither of these cases should provide much comfort, however. In 2009, the inventory of recently drilled shale wells was small, less than a thousand, accounting for just a fraction of national oil output, and prices rebounded very quickly.

U.S. gas production has been sustained despite low prices and a fall in the number of gas-directed rigs because of the huge increase in associated gas output from oil wells.

U.S. gas production been sustained by the oil boom. Shale oil producers have no such support. On balance, it is more likely than not that U.S. oil output will be declining by the end of the year unless prices rise from current levels. (Editing by William Hardy)

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